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ject of a demand by the United States of America or of any of its officers, agents, or employees, from any source or by any agency whatsoever, and all property of the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government, or its successor or successors, and of all Austro-Hungarian nationals which was on December 7, 1917, in or has since that date come into the possession or under control of, or has been the subject of a demand by the United States of America or any of its officers, agents, or employees, from any source or by any agency whatsoever, shall be retained by the United States of America and no disposition thereof made, except as shall have been heretofore or specifically hereafter shall be provided by law until such time as the Imperial German Government and the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government, or their successor or successors, shall have respectively made suitable provision for the satisfaction of all claims against said governments, respectively, of all persons, wheresoever domiciled, who owe permanent allegiance to the United States of America and who have suffered, through the acts of the Imperial German Government, or its agents, or the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government, or its agents, since July 31, 1914, loss, damage, or injury to their persons or property, directly or indirectly, whether through the ownership of shares of stock in German, Austro-Hungarian, American, or other corporations, or in consequence of hostilities or of any operations of war, or otherwise, and also shall have granted to persons owing permanent allegiance to the United States of America most-favored-nation treatment, whether the same be national or otherwise, in all matters affecting residence, business, profession, trade, navigation, commerce, and industrial property rights, and until the Imperial German Government and the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government, or their successor or successors, shall have respectively confirmed to the United States of America all fines, forfeitures, penalties, and seizures imposed or made by the United States of America during the war, whether in respect to the property of the Imperial German Government or German nationals or the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government or Austro-Hungarian nationals, and shall have waived any and all pecuniary claims against the United States of America.

Sec. 6. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to repeal, modify, or amend the provisions of the joint resolution "declaring that certain acts of Congress, joint resolutions, and proclamations shall be construed as if the war had ended and the present or existing emergency expired," approved March 3, 1921, or the passport control provisions of an act entitled "An act making appropriations for the Diplomatic and Consular Service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1922," approved March 2, 1921; nor to be effective to terminate the military status of any person now in desertion from the military or naval service of the United States, nor to terminate the liability to prosecution and punishment under the selective-service law, approved May 18, 1917, of any person who failed to comply with the provisions of said act, or of acts amendatory thereof.

President Harding signed the Peace resolution while staying at the country home of Senator Frelinghuysen, of New Jersey, over the Fourth of July week-end. He has taken his time, however, about issuing a proclamation of peace, and it is understood that the Attorney-General, Mr. Daugherty, is having thorough study made of the possible legal effects of a proclamation, before putting it into definite form.

## UNEXPECTED VICTORIES FOR OPPONENTS OF BIG WAR OUTLAYS

The advocates of curtailment of military preparation, whether on grounds of economy or because of belief that armaments do more to promote than to discourage wars, surprised Washington and probably surprised themselves by winning very substantial victories in the conference committees dealing with the Naval and Army Appropriation

bills. Against the vehement protests of old-time leaders in Congress and over the head of the Administration, as represented by Secretary of the Navy Denby and Secretary of War Weeks, they carried out the substance of their program. Unmindful of dire warnings, they forced acceptance of their judgment.

The result in the fighting in conference over the Naval bill was little short of spectacular, considered in the light of past performances in Congress. For years the Senate has had its way in the handling of Naval Appropriation bills, as in most other legislation involving differences of opinion between the two branches of Congress; but the Naval bill just agreed upon is millions of dollars nearer the total of approximately \$396,000,000 that was in the bill as it passed the House weeks ago than the total of \$494,000,000 that was in it when it passed the Senate some time later. The total of the bill agreed on is approximately \$403,000,000, which is \$91,000,000 less than the old Senate total and only \$7,000,000 more than the old House total.

Involved in the reduction of total appropriation is a reduction in the personnel of the Navy from 120,000 men, as favored by the Senate and vigorously urged by Secretary Denby, to 106,000, which includes the personnel of the aerial and radio services connected with the Navy. The House wanted the personnel clipped clean to 100,000 men, but yielded to the extent of 6,000 men, while the Senate yielded to the extent of 14,000. That decrease in personnel seems to be a direct blow at those elements which have been seeing danger of strife with Japan, and possibly with Great Britain, and have been urging the upbuilding of a great navy; for the decrease is a denial of even the more moderate of the preparedness advocates, such as are to be found in the Administration. The figure fixed in the agreement between the two branches of Congress cuts out all "luxuries" in the manning of ships and permits the employment only of ships that actually are necessary in the operations of the Navy today. Historic hulks, some of them carrying large crews at present, must be put out of commission.

The Army Appropriation bill, as agreed upon in conference and passed through both branches, carries a total appropriation of \$328,000,000. The settlement of the money question between the two branches, as to this bill, was not so difficult, because the Senate bill called for \$334,000,000 and the House bill for \$321,000,000, a difference between the two branches of \$13,000,000, whereas the difference in the Naval bill was nearly \$100,000,000. But there was the sharpest difference of opinion between the leaders of the two branches as to reduction of the army personnel, with the Administration, through Secretary Weeks, vigorously supporting the views of Senator Wadsworth, chairman of the Military Affairs Committee of the upper branch.

It will be recalled that when the Army bill was in the Senate a total of 150,000 men for the Army, instead of 170,000 men, was forced over Senator Wadsworth's most earnest objection. When the bill was taken up in conference the question of size was brought up again, and also, with even more heat, it appears, the question of time in which to make reductions. The Army now has about 220,000 men; so that the reduction to 150,000 means the discharge of 70,000, or about one-third. The House conferees were insistent that not only should there be the reduction, but that it should be accomplished by October. It was argued to them that only about 20,000 men would normally be discharged in the period between July and October. Senator

Wadsworth declared that an enforced reduction of 70,000 men in that period would be cruel, as the government would have to break enlistment contracts. Strong intimations came from Army people that such a reduction in so short a period would demoralize the Army. But the advocates of reduction, and immediate reduction, carried their point against all.

One clause in the bill as it passed is said to have worried Secretary Weeks greatly. In an amendment sponsored by Senator Borah it was provided that the War Department should not spend more than the amount actually given it. The Secretary is said to feel that this may compel him to break enlistment contracts with soldiers, as feared by Senator Wadsworth. The President took the position that the clause held the War Department down too tightly. A conference was held at the White House, following the passage of the bill, between the President and Secretary and several members of Congress. This provision was brought up. The information received later was that Senator Borah, who was in the conference, refused to change his position, and that it was decided by the Administration not to attempt to have Congress change the provision at this time, but to propose a change in the regular session.

Not less significant and interesting was the outcome of the differences over the disarmament resolution. The end of that fight was linked with the end of the fight over the Naval bill. Senator Borah had offered in the Senate his disarmament resolution (first proposed in the last session) as an amendment to the Naval bill. After President Harding had indicated opposition to it, there came a sudden shift, Administration Senators fell into line, and the Borah plan was attached to the Naval bill. But in the meantime Chairman Porter, of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, had offered in the House a general disarmament resolution, stated in broad terms—the Borah resolution called for action on naval disarmament between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan—and word spread through the Capitol that the Administration favored the Porter idea. The understanding was that the House would insist upon it, and thus kill the Borah plan. In spite of that, however, and because of a general feeling in the House that the Borah plan was more direct and practical and offered more promise of immediate, concrete results, the House conferees on the Naval bill accepted the Borah plan and it was adopted by the House.

On the day that the bill was passed in the House, with the Borah disarmament plan in it, the President sent to Republican Leader Mondell, understood to be supporting the Porter disarmament resolution, a letter which was regarded as a reserved expression in favor of the Porter measure. The President expressed himself as approving an expression by Congress in favor of disarmament, referred to the steps already taken by the Administration to promote disarmament, and then said that while the language to be used was less important than the taking of the action, he thought it would be best if the broadest and most general terms were used.

His letter, a characteristically tactful production, follows:

There has come to my attention the questions in disagreement between the two houses of Congress on the Naval bill, and I understand they are in process of adjustment, but that some difficulty has been experienced in arriving at a satisfactory agreement with regard to the language to be used in expressing the favorable attitude of the Congress toward efforts to secure international agreements for the limitation of armaments.

A number of members of Congress have been good enough to inquire as to the form of expression on the part of Congress which might seem most advisable from an administrative viewpoint.

I have said to inquirers, as I am now pleased to say to you, that it is not of particular concern to the Administration what form the expression of Congress shall take, though it is most agreeable that Congress shall express itself in favor of securing, if possible, an international agreement upon a program for the limitation of armaments.

I think it has been pretty well understood that the administrative branch of the government has already been seeking information with regard to the attitude of foreign nations on the general subject of disarmament. These inquiries and negotiations will be continued, and the time and manner in which the matter may be formally presented to foreign governments can only be determined after the fuller development of inquiries already initiated.

It is wholly desirable to have the expression of a favorable opinion on the part of Congress relating to this world question, and it would seem to me ample if it should be expressed in the broadest and most general terms.

I am vastly more concerned with the favorable attitude of the Congress on this question than I am as to the form of expressing that attitude. You may be sure that the Executive will be ready to give every consideration to such expression as the members of the two houses of Congress find themselves disposed to make.

The unwillingness of the House to follow the President's skillfully made suggestion, that the Porter plan be used, is held to be but another evidence of the same sentiment that upset the Senate in the fight over the Naval bill and forced great reductions, and also upset the old-line leaders by compelling almost precipitate reduction in the size of the Army. That sentiment calls for immediate action. It is the result of the pressure from the constituents of members of the House, all of whom will go before the people next year. The constituents want action at once in decreasing the great financial outlays for war. Idealism has become practicality. Humanitarianism is one with hard sense. The logic of the old-time workers against war has proved itself in the condition of the world, and the average man, with a demonstration of this logic in the form of tax bills, insists that the logic be heeded.

That, at least, is the explanation to be heard in Washington of the unexpected victories of the advocates of curtailment.

## OUTCROPPINGS FROM THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

The secrecy surrounding the sessions of the British Imperial Conference, a gathering pregnant of large potentialities for Britain and the world, has made it almost impossible to perceive the exact policy with respect to the question of renewing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, one of the major concerns, if not *the* major concern, of the conference. Thus, a few days ago there came out of London simultaneously a report that the treaty would continue automatically for one year, under a ruling of Lord Chancellor Birkenhead, and a report that a temporary extension of three months, from July to October, had been proposed to Japan by Great Britain and was being considered favorably. And both reports came from ordinarily reliable sources.

In explanation of the first report, it was stated that Lord Birkenhead held that in the event of failure of either Great Britain or Japan to denounce the treaty, it runs indefinitely, there being no necessity, under its terms, for formal renewal; and that it runs for a year after formal denuncia-